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EMPLOYER RIGHTS AND ACCESS TO
DOCUMENTS UNDER THE FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT
WALTER B. CONNOLLY* AND
JOHN C. FOX**
I. INTRODUCTION
IN the past year, an increasing number of Freedom of Information Act'
(FOIA) requests have been filed with federal government compliance
agencies seeking the Affirmative Action Plans (AAPs),2 Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Forms (EEO-ls), and Compliance Review Reports3
based on these plans and forms submitted pursuant to Executive Order
*B.A. Georgetown University, University of Detroit; J.D. University of Southern California.
Mr. Connolly is a partner in Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, Philadelphia, Washington, D.C.,
Harrisburg, Pa., and Los Angeles.
** B.A. University of California at Riverside; J.D. George Washington University. Mr. Fox is
an associate in the Washington, D.C., office of Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz.
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970 & Supp. V. 1975), as amended by Act of Sept. 13, 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-409, 90 Stat 1241.
2. An Affirmative Action Program is "a detailed, results-oriented set of procedures which,
when carried out with good faith efforts, results in compliance with the equal opportunity clause
through full utilization and equal treatment of minority groups and women, at all levels and in all
segments of the workforce. Through an AAP, a contractor seeks to:
-Establish strong company policy and commitment.
-Assign responsibility and authority for program to top company official.
-Analyze present workforce to identify jobs, departments and units where minorities and
females are underutilized.
-Set specific, measurable, attainable hiring and promotion goals, with target data, in each
area of underutilization.
--Make every manager and supervisor responsible and accountable for helping to meet these
goals.
-Re-evaluate job descriptions and hiring criteria to assure that they effect actual job needs.
-Find minorities and females who qualify or can become qualified to fill goals.
-Review and revise all employment procedures to assure that they do not have discriminatory
effects and that they help attain goals.
-Focus on getting minorities and females into upward mobility and relevant training pipelines
where they have not had previous access.
-Develop systems to monitor and measure progress regularly. If results are not satisfactory to
meet goals, find out why and make necessary changes."
OFCCP Compliance Manual § 3-300, reprinted in I Affirmative Action Compliance Manual for
Federal Contractors (BNA) 3:0004-05. See also Revised Order No. 4, 41 C.F.R. § 60-2. 10 to 2.14
(1976) (outlining the required contents of an AAP).
3. Compliance Review Reports are required to be made by Equal Employment Opportunity
Compliance Officers pursuant to Revised Order No. 14, 41 C.F.R. § 60-60 (1976). The reports
offer a candid and critical written evaluation of the company's equal employment programs.
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Number 11,246' by private contractors engaged in government con-
tracts. Public interest groups continue to make up the single largest
source of requests. Recently, however, FOIA requests have been filed by
labor unions and by direct market competitors. As a result, a rash of
so-called reverse FOIA cases5 have been defensively filed by employers
seeking to enjoin government release of their confidential affirmative
action data to the public. Results to date have been mixed with the
Supreme Court recently denying certiorari in two test cases brought to it.
One case allowed broad access to AAPs and EEO-1s 6 and the other case
firmly denied their disclosure. 7
Employers have also actively been using the FOIA on the offensive at
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to gain access to union
authorization cards filed with the NLRB by union organizers seeking
certification as the bargaining agent of the company's employees. Again
the case law has been divergent although employees have won early
victories. 8
The most common type of FOIA cases are those involving attempts by
employers to use the FOIA to expand the NLRB's traditionally nonexis-
tent discovery procedures in unfair labor practice proceedings. In over
twenty reported district court cases and no fewer than eleven circuit court
appeals, employers have sought discovery of witness statements gathered
by NLRB investigators during secret interrogations of employees. 9
Although closely rivaled by the number of FOIA cases brought by
corporations in litigation with the Federal Trade Commission, the
NLRB case law on access to employee witness statements represents
the cutting edge in the current controversy raging over the question of
whether the FOIA is a more appropriate discovery device than histori-
cally limited agency discovery procedures and rules available to those
in litigation with the agency. Despite passage, after veto, of the 1974
FOIA amendments 10 expanding access to documents, the federal appel-
late courts have nevertheless resoundingly rejected increased discovery
4. 3 C.F.R. 341 (1964-1965 Compilation).
5. A reverse FOIA case, as it has come to be known, is one brought by a private party to
prevent a government agency possessed of information ,ubmitted by that party about that party
from releasing it to members of the public.
6. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Usery, 426 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1976), appeal docketed,
No. 77-1270 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 15, 1977) (stay entered pending appeal), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct.
2198 (1977) (in advance of judgment from District of Columbia Circuit).
7. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 392 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Va. 1974), affd, 542
F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2199 (1977).
8. See pt. III infra.
9. See cases cited in notes 152-54 infra.
10. Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (codified at 5 US.C. § 552
(Supp. V 1975)).
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of labor agency investigative documents sought by companies prose-
cuted by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA),
the NLRB, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC).
In the Parts below, public rights of access under the FOIA to
documents in the possession of government agencies charged with
enforcing the labor laws are examined on an agency-by-agency basis.
In Part II, access to AAPs is discussed with emphasis on the practical
and legal means which a federal government contractor may take to
protect against their disclosure by the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance Programs (OFCCP) and to bar release of confidential and
trade secret information in the courts. In Part fII, case law concerning
purely offensive use of the FOIA by employers to get copies of NLRB
employee witness statements and union authorization cards is re-
viewed. In Part IV, rights of access to accident investigation reports
conducted by the OSHA and employee complaints to the OSHA about
unsafe conditions in the workplace are considered. In Part V, recent
case law regarding access to EEOC reports given to charging parties,
to predetermination settlement and conciliation agreements, and to
corporate documents in possession of the EEOC is examined.
I2. OFCCP FOIA CASES
Since February 1974, when the OFCCP promulgated regulations
implementing the 1974 amendments to the FOIA," the number of
requests for AAPs, EEO-ls, and Compliance Review Reports filed
with the OFCCP and its sixteen compliance agencies 12 by federal
11. 41 C.F.R. § 60-40 (1976).
12. Exec. Order No. 11,246 was issued by President Johnson in September 1965, delegating
the responsibility for equal employment opportunity compliance among federal contractors to the
Secretary of Labor. 3 C.F.R. 340 (1964-1965 Compilation).
By regulation published at 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.2 (1976), the Secretary of Labor delegated
administration of the Executive Order to the Director of the OFCCP.
In October 1965, the OFCCP was established within the Department of Labor to enforce the
equal employment opportunity mandate of Exec. Order No. 11,246. The Director of the OFCCP
has in turn delegated enforcement responsibility for the order to 16 federal departments, agencies,
and authorities. They are: the Department of Agriculture, the Energy Research and Development
Administration, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Defense, the Environmental
Protection Agency, the General Services Administration, the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare, the Department of the Interior, the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment, the Department of Justice, the Small Business Administration, the Tennessee Valley
Authority, the Department of Transportation, the Department of Treasury, the Veterans Admin-
istration, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The compliance respon-
sibilities of these 16 agencies were assigned on an industry-by-industry basis pursuant to Revised
Order No. 1. (Aug. 1, 1974), reprinted in 1 Affirmative Action Compliance Manual for Federal
Contractors (BNA) 2:0025-35.
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government contractors pursuant to Executive Order Number 11,246
has skyrocketed. This has occurred in response to the announcement in
those regulations that for the first time EEO-ls would be released
without qualification 13 and that AAPs would be released 14 except for
goals and timetables. 15 In addition, it was announced that staffing
pattern information and pay scales 16 and Compliance Review Reports 17
would be released unless these data were found to constitute trade
secret information. The OFCCP retained the right by regulation,
however, to release even information conceded to be a trade secret if
the OFCCP deemed that the public interest in disclosure outweighed
the contractor's interest in confidentiality.' 8
As a result, FOIA requests to the OFCCP and its sixteen compliance
agencies have flooded Washington. In one case, counsel for a tire com-
pany requested the Compliance Review Reports for all of its major
rubber indus'try competitors. 19 In most cases, however, requests have
been filed by labor union representatives20 or public interest groups
hoping to use the information in collective bargaining or in Title VII
13. 41 C.F.R. § 60-40.4 (1976).
14. Id. § 60-40.2(b)(1).
15. Id. § 60-40.3(a)(1). Goals and timetables are the culmination of the underutilization analysis
required to be filed with all AAPs. A goal must be established for each job group in which
underutilization of minorities or women exists; i.e., where the percentage of minority workforce
population in a job group is lower than the percentage of available minorities or women in the
applicable labor area population. Once a minority workforce goal has been identified, a specific
timetable must then be established to reach the goal in the minimum feasible time period. See
OFCCP Compliance Manual § 3-501(c), reprinted in I Affirmative Action Compliance Manual for
Federal Contractors (BNA) 3:0008-09.
16. 41 C.F.R. § 60-40.3(a)(2) (1976).
17. Id. § 60-40.3(a)(5).
18. Id. § 60-40.3(a).
19. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Kleppe, No. 76-781-A (E.D. Va. March 11, 1977).
20. Labor unions have also sought affirmative action data for collective bargaining purposes
pursuant to the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) rather than under the FOIA. In several cases
of first impression currently pending before the NLRB, employers have refused to make
affirmative action data available to unions seeking it, prompting the unions to file unfair labor
practice charges under section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970), alleging that the
employers have refused to bargain in good faith.
Exceptions to disclosure orders by NLRB administrative law judges have been filed in the
following cases: Westinghouse Elec. Corp. & IUE, No. 6-CA-7680 (N.L.R.B., filed Mar. 15, 1976);
East Dayton Tool & Die Co. & Electrical Workers (IUE), No. 9-CA-8887 (N.L.R.B., filed July 1,
1975). See also General Motors Corp., No. 9-CA-9275 (N.L.R.B., filed Dec. 9, 1976); Markle
Mfr. Co., No. 23-CA-5460 (N.L.R.B., filed May 5, 1976). Automation & Measuring Div. of Bendix
Corp., No. 9-CA-8762 (N.L.R.B., filed July 8, 1975); White Farm Equip., No. 9-CA-9385
(N.L.R.B., filed July 2, 1975) (cases involving contested disclosure orders independently awaiting
oral argument before the NLRB).
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litigation against the contractor or to attack the public relations image of
the company. Government Compliance Review Reports are a prime
target for such FOIA requests because of their orientation toward gov-
ernment enforcement and criticism of the employer's affirmative action
programs. A common corporate concern, however, is that release of
subjective government opinions, even where unsubstantiated by the
underlying facts, will provoke litigation or further disrupt already emo-
tional collective bargaining sessions because the statement carries the
imprimatur of the United States government. Tabulations of employee
workforce minority populations (Workforce Analyses2 l) are also highly
sought after because of their statistical utility in Title VII cases.
A. Practical Guides for Case
Preparation: At the Agency
Reverse FOIA cases tend to move slowly through the administrative
agency but accelerate quickly through the courts. Because reverse FOIA
plaintiffs first seek extraordinary relief in the federal courts by way of a
temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction, and because
FOIA cases are accorded expedited docketing,2 2 trial counsel must be
prepared to try his entire case on the merits'-complete with expert
witnesses, motions, and briefs-within ten to twenty days of the date
21. A workforce Analysis is the first part ofan Underutilization Analysis required to be filed with
all AAPs. It must contain: "a listing of each job title as appears in applicable collective bargaining
agreements orpayroll records (not job group) ranked from the lowest paid to the highest paid within
each department or other similar organizational unit including departmental or unit supervision. If
there are separate work units or lines of progression within a department a separate list must be
provided for each such work unit, or line, including unit supervisors. For lines of progression there
must be indicated the order ofjobs in the line through which an employee could move to the top of the
line. Where there are no formal progression lines or usual promotional sequences, job titles should be
listed by department, job families, or disciplines, in order of wage rates or salary ranges. For each job
title, the total number of incumbents, and the total number of male and female incumbents in each of
the following groups must be given: Blacks, spanish-surnamed Americans, American Indians, and
Orientals. The wage rate or salary range for each job title must be given. All job titles, including
managerial job titles, must be listed." 41 C.F.t. 60-2.11(a) (1976).
22. The FOIA provides: "Except as to cases the court considers of greater importance,
proceedings before the district court, as authorized by this subsection, and appeals therefrom,
take precedence on the docket over all cases and shall be assigned for hearing and trial or for
argument at the earliest practicable date and expedited in every way." 5 U.S.C. § 552(aX(4)(D)
(Supp. V 1975). In practice, the only cases which generally take precedence over FOIA cases on
the docket are criminal cases pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (Supp.
V 1975).
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established by the compliance agency for release of the contractor's
documents. 23
Trial counsel should therefore use his time judiciously while adminis-
trative remedies are being exhausted to secure expert witnesses, draw up
pleadings, and prepare arguments and authorities in advance of the
document release date. Under the time limits imposed on the agencies to
process FOIA requests, agencies may take ten working days after receipt
of an FOIA request to decide whether or not to comply. 24 The agency
may in "unusual circumstances" take a ten working day extension at the
request level.2 5 An appeal of the request may be taken by the requester to
the head of the agency, if any part of his request is denied. The agency
must respond to the appeal within twenty working days26 but may take
an additional ten working days extension at the appeal level. 27 The
government, therefore, can take up to at least fifty working days, if it so
desires, to determine whether to comply with an FOIA request. If an
agency fails to respond during the time limits or properly to invoke its
extensions, an FOIA requester may deem his request denied and his
administrative remedies exhausted and file suit seeking to compel disclo-
sure in federal district court.2 8
In practice, the sixteen contract compliance agencies usually give a
government contractor notice of the pendency of an FOIA request seek-
ing its documents. In addition, the agencies give the contractor a stated
time period within which to appeal the agency decision to disclose to
the head of the agency. Because of the complexity and ever-changing
nature of the case law, however, the agencies usually take longer than
twenty days to dispose of the contractor's appeal, if one is filed. Unless the
FOIA requester intervenes with the agency or deems its administrative
23. In Vistron Corp. v. Andrus, Civ. No. 77-85-A (E.D. Va. Feb. 23, 1977), only II days
expired between the date the complaint was filed and trial on the merits of the permanent
injunction was held. In Metropolitan Life, the trial included three days of testimony and
certiorari in advance of judgment was filed in the Supreme Court. 426 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C.
1976), appeal docketed, No. 77-1270 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 15, 1977), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2198
(1977).
24. These time limits were first prescribed in the 1974 amendments to the FOIA. 5 U.SC.
§ 552(a)(6)(A)(i) (Supp. V 1975).
25. Id. § 552(a)(6)(B).
26. Id. § 552(a)(6)(A)(ii).
27. Id. § 552(a)(6)(B).
28. The courts have taken a practical approach to the anguished cries of overburdened
agency FOIA units that compliance with the time limits is not feasible. Two circuit courts have
responded to these pleas and have rejected claims seeling a strict application of the time limit
provisions. They have required agencies only to process requests in good faith and with due
diligence on a first-come, first-served basis. See Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution
Force, 547 F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Exner v. FBI, 542 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1976).
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remedies exhausted, however, the contractor will be content to let the
agency delay in deciding its appeal.
If the agency denies the contractor's appeal, usually the contractor is
then notified and given anywhere from two to five days to get to court to
seek injunctive relief if it so desires. The contest then becomes a race to
the court for the contractor's attorney.
B. Due Process: A Contractor's Right
to Notice of the FOIA Request
Because of the multiplicity of agency regulations and the often
haphazard agency procedures employed, one increasingly litigated issue
is the contractor's right to notice of the FOIA request and an opportunity
to be heard with regard to it. Although the agencies usually give a
contractor notice of a request seeking its data, this is not always the
case. 29 As a result, due process challenges asserting three distinct rights
have been brought by contractors. These rights include (1) the right of the
contractor to be notified of the FOIA request at the time it is made to the
agency, (2) the right of the contractor to a hearing before the agency on the
merits of the issues presented, and (3) sufficient opportunity to seek
injunctive relief in the courts prior to the date set by the agency for release
of the requested documents. 30
Currently, only the Food and Drug Administration, not one of the
sixteen designated government contract compliance agencies, 31 has es-
tablished procedures for notice to a contractor and appeal from an agency
decision to disclose information requested under the FOIA. 32
To lesser extents, the sixteen contract compliance agencies provide for
the possibility of notice to information suppliers. The FOIA implement-
ing regulations 33 promulgated by the Department of the Interior, for
29. In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Kleppe, No. 76-781-A (E.D. Va. Mar. 11, 1977), the
Government failed to give Firestone notice of an FOIA request seeking'its data. Having gotten
wind of the FOIA request informally, Firestone sued for and won the right to two days prior
notice of any release of its affirmative action data.
30. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Cross Motion for Summary Judgment
and in Opposition to Defendants' Alternative Motion to Dismiss at S, Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Kleppe, No. 76-781-A (E.D. Va. Mar. 11, 1977).
31. See note 12 supra.
32. See Note, Re-verse Freedom of Information Act Suits: Confidential Information in Search
of Protection, 70 Nw. U.L. Rev. 995, 999 n.21 (1976).
33. Each agency was required to publish regulations implementing the FOIA. S U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(1)(A)-(D), (4)(A) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). These regulations appear in the various volumes
of the Code of Federal Regulations. Because the OFCCP has not taken the lead in promulgating
standardized procedures for the handling of requests made to agencies seeking affirmative action
data, each agency follows its own FOIA implementing regulations. As a result, contractor rights
and obligations in reverse FOIA cases may vary from agency to agency. The individual
1977]
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example, state that the agency will attempt to notify the person or entity
who supplied the information "when it is administratively feasible to do
S0."734
In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Kleppe, 35 the Department of the
Interior failed to give Firestone notice of a request filed by a direct market
competitor seeking Compliance Review Reports for Firestone and all
other tire companies. 3 6 The OFCCP itself has no regulation providing for
notice to a contractor. Rather, the OFCCP has argued that there are
"internal policy requirements in the Office of Federal Contract Com-
pliance Programs and its compliance agencies that contractors generating
data be given notice and opportunity to be heard upon the confidentiality
and competitive harmful aspects of the data that they have submitted.
This policy is reflected in the language of applicable regulations; e.g., 41
C.F.R. 60-60.4(d) and 60-40.3(a)(1). ' '3 7
Section 60-60.4(d) of title 41 of the Code of Federal Regulations 38
has not been followed by the OFCCP, however, and agency officials
have proffered in private conversations that the procedures outlined
there could not be followed because of the massive logjam of cases that
would occur. In addition, the OFCCP has taken a legal position in the
courts which makes implementation of their regulation in reverse
FOIA situations untenable.
regulations of each agency should therefore be separately consulted. Citations to the applicable
regulations are as follows:
1. Department of Agriculture: 7 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-1.16 and §§ 1.110-.123 (1977).
2. Energy Research and Development Administration: 10 C.F.R. §§ 708.1-.23 (1977).
3. Department of Commerce: 15 C.F.R. §§ 4.1-.9 (1977).
4. Department of Defense (Defense Supply Agency): 32 C.F.R. §§ 1285.1-.8 (1976).
5. Environmental Protection Agency: 40 C.F.R. §§ 2.100-.121 (1976).
6. General Services Administration: 41 C.F.R. §§ 105-60.000 to -60.701 (1976).
7. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare: 45 C.F.R. §§ 5.1-.85 (1976).
8. Department of the Interior: 43 C.F.R. §§ 2.1- 82 (1976).
9. Department of Housing and Urban Development: 24 C.F.R. §§ 15.1-.74 (1976).
10. Department of Justice: 28 C.F.R. §§ 16.1-.101 (1976).
11. Small Business Administration: 13 C.F.R. §§ 102.1-.36 (1976).
12. Tennessee Valley Authority: 18 C.F.R. §§ 301 1-.48 (1977).
13. Department of Transportation: 49 C.F.R. §§ 7.1-.101 (1976).
14. Department of the Treasury: 31 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-.36 (1976).
15. Veterans Administration: 38 C.F.R. §§ 1.500-.584 (1976).
16. National Aeronautics and Space Administration: 14 C.F.R. §§ 1206.100-.900 (1976).
34. 43 C.F.R. § 2.15(b)(2) (1976).
35. No. 76-781-A (E.D. Va. Mar. 11, 1977).
36. The court in Firestone rejected this position, imposing notice requirements on the
Department of the Interior. See text accompanying note 41 infra.
37. Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment or In the
Alternative to Dismiss at 4, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Kleppe, No. 76-781-A (E.D. Va.
Mar. 11, 1977).
38. 41 C.F.R. § 60-60.4(d) (1976).
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Section 60-60.4(d) states:
Public access to information. Information obtained from a contractor under Subpart B
[Procedures for Disclosure] will be subject to the public inspection and copying provisions
of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552. Contractors should identify any
information which they believe is not subject to disclosure under 5 U.S.C. 552, and should
specify the reasons why such information is not disclosable. The Contract Compliance
Officer will consider the contractor's claim and make a determination, within 10 days, as
to whether the material in question is exempt from disclosure. The contract compliance
officer will inform the contractor of such a determination. The contractor may appeal that
ruling to the Director of OFCC within 10 days. The Director of OFCC shall make a final
determination within 10 days of the filing of the appeal. However, during the conduct of a
compliance review or while enforcement action against the contractor is in progress or
contemplated within a reasonable time, all information obtained from a contractor under
Subpart B except information disclosable under §§ 60-40.2 and 6040.3 of this chapter is
to be considered part of an investigatory file compiled for law enforcement purposes
within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(7), and such information obtained from a contrac-
tor under Subpart B shall be treated as exempt from mandatory disclosure under the
Freedom of Information Act during the compliance review.3 9
The regulations thus contemplate that contractors itemize their objec-
tions to release at the time they first submit their affirmative action data to
the OFCCP. Theoretically, a compliance officer would consider the
contractor's claim within ten days and notify him of his decision to either
honor or deny it. The contractor would presumably have an opportunity
to appeal this decision to the Director of the OFCCP and thereafter to the
courts. However, the regulations indicate that this procedure should be
accomplished in advance of a specific FOIA request for the data.
In practice, the OFCCP and all sixteen compliance agencies routinely
ignore contractors' letters claiming that their affirmative action data is
confidential until the FOIA request seeking the data is filed with the
agency. Only then do the agencies make a determination with regard to
the contractor's confidentiality claims and even then only as regards the
precise information requested. If the contractor is dissatisfied with the
determination made, the contractor may appeal the initial decision of the
compliance agency to the Director of the OFCCP.40
Too, contractors find it difficult to specify what information is
confidential under all abstract situations which may arise, a problem
exacerbated by ever-changing market conditions and the daily aging of
the documents. Labor cost data submitted in 1975, for example, may
have no competitive utility in 1980; yet the OFCCP's regulations, if
followed, would require the contractor to undertake expert witness fees
39. Id.
40. A glimpse of the actual operating procedures employed by the OFCCP in reverse FOIA
cases is briefly provided by the Department of Labor in OFCCP Equal Employment Opportunity
Proposed Revisions and Redesignation of Regulations, 41 Fed. Reg. 40344 (1976).
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and legal expenses in 1975 in the event of a hypothetical request which
may never come.
The simple option would be to provide contractors, by uniform
regulation, with notice of FOIA requests for their data and allow them
an opportunity to argue their position before the agency and the court
prior to the time the data is to be released. The OFCCP has not
indicated any willingness to change its regulations. The Department of
Labor may have given some thought to doing so in light of the Eastern
District of Virginia's requirement in Firestone that contractors receive
at least two working days in which to get to court following a decision
of the OFCCP to release its confidential affirmative action submissions
to an FOIA requester. 4 1
Application of section 60-60.4(d) is further hampered by the legal
position that the OFCCP and the Department of Justice have taken in
the courts to the effect that article III of the Constitution requires a
case or controversy to exist and that a contractor may not seek to bar
disclosure in the absence of a request.
In Firestone, OFCCP argued:
In the absence of a specific request for certain documents, and agency consideration
of that request, and the decision of the agency to release, the parties cannot be said to
be 'in substantial controversy' [within the meaning of article III] as to the release of
data in the documents themselves. The language chosen by a particular requestor to
describe the information he wishes to obtain, the response of the agency to that
language in deciding whether in fact, records are maintained by the agency which
satisfy that request, and the decision of that agency within the parameters of its
regulations and policies upon the material to be withheld under an exemption of the
Act, are all variables which cannot be defined until the instance itself arises. The facts
as alleged in this complaint given the withdrawal of the request do not constitute
circumstances that are ripe for judicial review.42
That such procedural rights of notice and an opportunity to be heard
should be accorded to contractors would appear to be required if
elementary principles of the due process clause of the fifth amendment
41. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Kleppe, No. 76-781-A (E.D. Va. Mar. 11, 1977). Nine
days notice of disclosure was also provided by agreement in Continental Cas. Co. v. Marshall,
No. 75-1836 (D.D.C. Apr. 15, 1977).
42. Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment or in the
Alternative to Dismiss at 3, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Kleppe, No. 76-781-A (E.D. Va.
Mar. 11, 1977). See also Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Weinberger, 401 F. Supp. 444 (D.D.C.
1975) (preliminary injunction sought against FDA regulations not providing for notice to
companies of the proposed release of their data pursuant to the FOIA denied in the absence of a
specific FOIA request for the information). Currently pending is a similar suit brought by the
Chemical Specialties Manufacturers Association against the Consumer Products Safety Commis-
sion seeking to compel assurances that adequate saf,,guards will be taken to insure the
confidentiality of information submitted to that agency Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Ass'n v.
Consumer Prods. Safety Comm'n, No. 75-1722 (D.D.C., filed Oct. 17, 1975).
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are to be satisfied. With regard to property rights, it has been held that
a hearing is required to be held before an individual is deprived of a
property interest. 43
Similarly, advance notice of government action affecting the rights of
individuals has been construed to be required as a corollary to the right to
be heard and was expressly recognized in Fuentes v. Shevin, 44 where it
was held that: "For more than a century the central meaning of pro-
cedural due process has been clear: 'Parties whose rights are to be affected
are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they
must first be notified.' ",45 Further, it has been held that the right to be
heard "has little reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter is
pending and can choose for himself whether to ... contest. '46
The right to a hearing has also been construed in administrative
settings to require the government to grant affected persons
not only the right to present evidence but also a reasonable opportunity to know the
claims of the opposing party and to meet them. The right to submit argument implies that
opportunity; otherwise the right may be but a barren one. Those who are brought into
contest with the Government in a quasi-judicial proceeding aimed at the control of their
activities are entitled to be fairly advised of what the Government proposes and to be heard
upon its proposals before it issues its final command. 47
In the recent case of Mathews v. Eldridge,48 Mr. Justice Rehnquist
addressed the issue of whether due process required the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare to establish administrative procedures
granting pre-determination hearings before cutting off social security
disability benefits. Writing on behalf of the court, he established a three-
part test to determine whether administrative procedures are sufficiently
cognizant-under the due process clause-of the private interests af-
fected. It was held that the court must consider:
first, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Govern-
ment's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 49
43, See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
557-58 (1974); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1931); Dent v. West Virginia, 129
U.S. 114, 124-25 (1889).
44. 407 US. 67 (1972).
45. Id. at 80.
46. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (19S). See also Goss
v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Boeing Air Transp. v. Farley, 75 F.2d 765, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1935).
47. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1938); Parker v. Lester, 227 F.2d 703 (9th
Cir. 1955). See also Gonzalez v. United States, 348 U.S. 407 (1954).
48. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
49. Id. at 335.
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1. The Private Interest at Stake
The single most problematical aspect of any FOIA case involving the
release, whether purposeful or inadvertent, of confidential AAP and
EEO-i data is that it will irreparably injure the contractor which
supplied the information. The potential injury arising from such a release
is simply not compensable. Thus, successful appeal of an administrative
agency's release of the information will neither restore the contractor to its
former position nor make it whole.
Such an injury rises to the level of the deprivation described in
Goldberg v. Kelly,5 0 a case in which it was found that the temporary
deprivation of welfare assistance pending resolution of a controversy
over eligibility claims worked such a hardship on the claimant that due
process required an administrative evidentiary hearing prior to the
threatened deprivation. Injury of a similar magnitude and quality is in
store for contractors whose AAPs and EEO-ls are released because of
the irreparable nature of the injury. As such, Goldberg is persuasive of
the need for a predeterminational hearing into the merits of the
threatened release of affirmative action data.
2. The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
of the Contractor's Interest
Through the Procedures Used
The risk of erroneous release of a contractor's affirmative action data
is high. As the Fourth Circuit recently noted in Westinghouse:
[T]here is always the real risk that the agency itself will be delinquent in asserting the
rights of the private party. After all, it could not care less about protecting the
competitive position of a supplier of information. That is no part of its responsibility.
Neither does it have, as has already been observed, in most instances, sufficient
knowledge to assert properly the private party's right to confidentiality. And it must
not be forgotten that the protection of a competitive position is both a valuable and
often complex matter, dependent upon full proof, and one "basic to our free enterprise
system." 5
In addition, the potential for injury is heightened by the presence of
numerous compliance agencies whose duty it is to exercise compliance
responsibility under Executive Order Number 11,246. It is further
exacerbated by the proliferation of Freedom of Information offices
within the federal government, an estimated 5,000 to 6,000 offices
alone within the United States Department of Defense. Most agencies
have decentralized the authority to disclose data and allow countless
50. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
51. 542 F.2d 1190, 1213 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2199 (1977) (footnote omitted).
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thousands of persons to remove information from files and mail it out
to requesters.5 2
3. The Government's Interest
and Administrative Burdens
Were administrative agencies to extend notice and the opportunity
to be heard to contractors seeking to protect their confidential submis-
sions, it is difficult to believe that the additional administrative burden
involved would stall the federal contract compliance program. At any
rate, such a program would not outweigh the potential for irreparable
injury to contractors under the currently existing no-notice system.
Indeed, the presence of contractors at an administrative hearing would
in all likelihood benefit the agency, bring issues into focus, and help to
relieve the agency of burdensome and time-consuming fact-finding
missions.
As regards societal costs, it should be noted that reverse FOIA cases
make up only a very small percentage of all FOIA cases litigated.
In addition, a private industrial competitor should not be re-
quired to suffer the risk of irreparable injury on behalf of the public
because of the additional costs, however large, imposed on society by
passage of the FOIA. This would appear to be especially true given the
congressional intent embodied within exemption 4 of the FOIA to
exempt financial information from disclosure.5
3
A common refrain often recited by the compliance agencies and
OFCCP is that they simply do not have the time under the ten and
twenty day time period limitations imposed by the 1974 amendments
to allow contractors an opportunity to be heard. This would appear to
be a spurious argument, however, in light of the decision in Open
America v. The Watergate Special Prosecution Force,54 which held
that agencies could extend the time limits for decision so long as the
agency was acting in good faith, with due diligence, and on a first-
come, first-served basis.55
Thus, after a consideration of all three factors figuring in the test of
52. Correspondingly, the right to deny access to data has generally been centralized in a few
FOIA specialists assigned to the agency's head office in Washington. This has occurred as a result
of the increasing complexity of the FOIA, the need for uniformity of decision making within the
agency, and because of the stringent sanctions threatened by the FOIA for arbitrary and
capricious refusal by government personnel to disclose non-exempt documents. See 5 U.S.C. §
552(a)(4)(E)-(F) (Supp. V 1975).
53. H.R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10(1966); S. Rep. No. 813,89th Cong., 1st Sess.
9 (1965).
54. 547 F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
55. Id. at 616.
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the need for administrative due process in cases involving the release
of confidential affirmative action data, it would appear that nothing
more than agency stubbornness stands in the way of making due
process a reality.
C. Preparing for Court Action
Once notice has been received by the contractor, he should im-
mediately request a copy of all materials proposed for release. The
compliance agencies are loathe to make copies on the grounds that it is
expensive and that the contractors have copies of the documents they
supplied. A bigger practical problem for most agencies is that they
have limited reproduction facilities and may have to give up actual
possession of the documents to their reproduction rooms for weeks.
These agency objections should be overridden, however, because it
is often unclear, for many reasons, which documents in fact are
proposed for release. First, each agency has its own vocabulary. For
example, the term Affirmative Action Plan may be construed to mean
the plan with or without accompanying attachments. Second, the
agencies apply their own numbering system to documents for their
internal use with the aid of an automatic consecutive numbering
machine. The contractor has no knowledge of this numbering system
because the page numbers are added after the documents are submit-
ted.
Third, if a Compliance Review Report is at issue, in all likelihood the
contractor has not seen it and probably does not have a copy. Finally,
agencies are under a duty pursuant to the FOIA to segregate out non-
exempt material and release it.5 6 As a result, the compliance agency may
intend to release only certain pages or even portions of certain para-
graphs. Routinely, documents are released with portions of lines deleted
in mid-sentence. Under these circumstances, there is no better substitute
for the documents proposed to be released than a photocopy of the precise
document to be released as marked up with deletions, scratch outs, and
white outs.5 7
56. "Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting
such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt under this subsection." 5 U.S.C. §
552(b) (Supp. V 1975); see Rose v. Department of Air Force, 495 F.2d 261, 268 (2d Cir. 1974),
aff'd, 425 U.S. 352 (1976); Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 977 (1974); Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 938-39, (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 824 (1970); Fisher v. Renegotiation Bd., 355 F. Supp. 1171 (D.D.C. 1973); Wellford v.
Hardin, 315 F. Supp. 768 (D.D.C. 1970).
57. For example, in Vistron Corp. v. Andrus, No. 77-85-A (E.D. Va. Feb. 23, 1977), counsel
for Vistron was denied a copy of the documents proposed for release and initiated a reverse FOIA
suit on the basis of the documents contained in the contractor's files and the Department of the
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After receiving the documents, counsel should consult experts early on
to determine what information can be defended in the courts as trade
secret data. If possible, these experts should help take part in drafting a
letter of appeal, in conjunction with counsel, to the head of the OFCCP
expressing the company's objections. This appeal letter need not be long
or take the form of a legal brief but should simply identify the competitive
harm which would result -from the release of the various documents at
issue. Counsel should consider that the information given to the agency
at this point could serve as discovery for the government of legal
theories which the contractor may raise subsequently at trial. It should be
specifically noted in this regard that there is no bar to raising new legal
theories at trial in federal district court not previously raised before the
agency.
Once the agency has acted on the contractor's letter of appeal, the
contractor is deemed to have exhausted his administrative remedies.
D. Going to Court
Once the compliance agency has made its decision to release and the
contractor has exhausted his appeal to the director of the OFCCP, the
contractor may then initiate suit in the federal district court to enjoin
release of its data. This entails filing a complaint, a motion for a tempo-
rary restraining order (TRO) supported by affidavits, a motion for a
preliminary injunction, and points and authorities in support of one's
motions. The court will normally consider the TRO on the basis of the
affidavits alone and without the need to put an expert witness on the
stand. Expert witnesses will be required at the hearing for a preliminary
injunction.
In jurisdictions where numerous reverse FOIA cases have been
brought and the judge is familiar with the issues and the case law, he may
well want to set the hearings for the preliminary and permanent injunc-
tions together and dispose of them both at one time. This approach is
encouraged by the mandate that FOIA cases take expedited docketing
but the result is brutal on trial counsel who must then prepare a case often
within ten working days.58
Interior's descriptions of the portions of the documents to be released. Only after a court hearing
was in progress, and at the direction of the judge, was the contractor and its counsel finally able
to view the documents proposed for release. The agency discovered only then that there were
different and supplemental documents on file with it and that the contractor was objecting to the
disclosure of documents in its files which the agency did not intend to release. Furthermore, after
additional comparisons were made, the Department discovered new files it had overlooked earlier
and concluded that these additional documents also fell within the scope of the original FOIA
request.
58. Although counsel had months to prepare in Metropolitan Life, a test case in the insurance
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Federal courts have repeatedly recognized the need for an evidentiary
hearing de novo before the trial judge on the merits of the exemption from
disclosure claimed by the contractor. 59 As a result, the contractor must be
ready to show at trial that the material it seeks to bar from disclosure is
confidential, that there are competitors in the industry to whom the
information may be useful, and that the data's release will cause substan-
tial competitive injury.
Corporate personnel such as plant managers and industrial relations
directors may be relied on to testify about procedures undertaken at the
company to protect the confidentiality of the data at issue and corporate
marketing managers may testify about the use to which competitors could
put the information. Expert witnesses, usually university industrial eco-
nomics professors, should also be called to testify about economic matters,
especially where discovery of labor costs is at issue, and to testify regard-
ing the nature of competition in the industry.
Additional experts may be necessary depending upon the precise issues
raised in the case. In Metropolitan Life, for example, extensive testimony
was taken from psychologists about the morale problems and competitive
injury which would beset a contractor whose employees learned the
contents of supervisor promotion memoranda in their personnel files.
Moreover, economics professors, personnel department managers, and
even professional "head hunters" have been brought to the stand to testify
about how they would go about using affirmative action data to lure away
a contractor's management level minority employees.
E. Procedural Questions Raised
by Reverse FOIA Cases
1. Jurisdiction
Although the Department of Justice has energetically disputed the
existence of a jurisdictional basis for reverse FOIA cases by contractors,
"no court has [ever] failed to find jurisdiction. '60 It has only been since
February of this year, however, with the Supreme Court's decision in
industry, the court heard three days of testimony. Even a relatively simple reverse case with few
factual issues usually involves a solid day of trial time.
59. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, 553 F.2d 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1213 (4th Cir. 19761, cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2199 (1977);
Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 939-40, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
60. Note, Protection from Government Disclosure-The Reverse-FOIl Suit, 1976 Duke L.J.
330, 347. See also Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1204 (4th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2199 (1977), and cases cited therein; Note, Reverse Freedom of
Information Act Suits; Confidential Information in Search of Protection, 70 Nw. U.L. Rev. 995,
1002-09 (1976).
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Califano v. Sanders, 6 that it has been clear that section 1331 of title 28 of
the United States Code62 (federal question jurisdiction) and not section
10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act6 3 (APA) is the proper jurisdic-
tional grounds. In Sanders, the Court held that the APA did not imply an
independent grant of subject matter jurisdiction in the federal courts for
litigants "aggrieved by agency action." 64 In a recent reverse FOIA
case, one court of appeals revised its jurisdictional view in light of
Sanders and found jurisdiction instead under section 133 1(a). 6s Despite
the change in the jurisdictional basis, form only and not substance is
affected. The legal tests employed in reverse FOIA cases brought
under both the APA and section 1331 have always been the same.
Under both statutes, the issues were tried de novo in the federal
district court pursuant to the mandate of the FOIA and not under the
"abuse of discretion"6 6 standard of review dictated by the APA. 67
61. 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970) was amended to eliminate the requirement of a specified amount
in controversy as a prerequisite to suit against the Government. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-574, 90 Stat. 2721. The amended statute reads: "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States except that no such sum or value shall be required in any such action brought
against the United States, any agency thereof, or any officer or employee thereof in his official
capacity." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (Supp. 1977).
63. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970) (the current codification of section 10(a) of the APA). Section 10(a)
states, in part, "a person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review
thereof." Id.
64. 430 U.S. at 100-01 & n.1. In the District of Columbia, jurisdiction had been found for
reverse FOIA's under the APA. Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.
1975). In Westinghouse, however, the Fourth Circuit found jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1970). 542 F.2d 1190, 1209 n.60 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2199 (1977). See also
Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 412 F. Supp. 171, 174-75 (D. Del. 1976); Burroughs Corp. v.
Schlesinger, 403 F. Supp. 633, 634 (E.D. Va. 1975) (finding jurisdiction on both grounds);
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 292, 294 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
Prior to Sanders, seven of the eleven federal appellate circuits had held that section 10 of the
APA was an independent grant of jurisdiction. Sanders v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1167 (7th Cir.
1975), rev'd sub nom. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977); Ortego v. Weinberger, 516 F.2d
1005 (5th Cir. 1975); Pickus v. United States Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
Bradley v. Weinberger, 483 F.2d 410 (1st Cir. 1973); Brandt v. Hickel, 427 F.2d 53 (9th Cir.
1970); Brennan v. Udall, 379 F.2d 803 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 975 (1967); Deering
Milliken, Inc. v. Johnson, 295 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1961).
65. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, 553 F.2d 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
66. Section 10(e) of the APA states: "To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The
reviewing court shall... (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
found to be--(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law . . . ." 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970).
67. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1206-07 (4th Cir. 1976), cert.
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2. Venue
Under the 1974 amendments to the FOIA,68 venue is proper in any of
three places: where the complainant resides or has his principal place of
business, where the agency records are situated, or in the District of
Columbia. 69 These venue provisions give great latitude to the contractor
to pick his judicial forum.
The first venue provision is very liberal and is actually twofold in that it
allows a corporation to sue where it resides or where it has its principal
place of business. The residence of a plaintiff corporation suing the
Government in federal district-court is, for venue purposes, in the state
and district in which it has been incorporated. 70 Thus a company incor-
porated in Delaware with its principal place of business in Illinois would
have proper venue in either jurisdiction under the first clause of the
FOIA's venue provisions.
The second venue provision is often relied upon by multi-facility
national contractors whose compliance agencies are located in Virginia in
order to bring their reverse FOIA case in the Eastern District of Virginia
and thus get within the jurisdiction of the Fourth Circuit. Given the
Fourth Circuit's favorable decision in Westinghouse,7 1 it is a generally
more desirable jurisdiction in which to find venue than across the
Potomac River in the District of Columbia. 72
denied, 97 S. Ct. 2199 (1977); Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 941 (D.C.
Cir. 1975); United States Steel Corp. v. Schlesinger, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 923, 924 (E.D. Va.
1974), aff'd sub nom. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1197 (4th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2199 (1977).
The district court in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, 384 F. Supp. 996 (D.D.C. 1974), similarly
rejected the agency's claim that the "abuse of discretion test" was to be used by the court on
review, despite the fact that jurisdiction was grounded in the APA narrowly to apply "only when
there is 'no law' that can be applied by the court in its review of the agency." Id. at 1001.
68. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (Supp. V 1975).
69. Id.; cf. East Tenn. Research Corp. v. TVA, 416 F. Supp. 988 (D.D.C. 1976) (extra-
territorial service of process on a non-resident defendant is always proper under the FOIA or Fed. R.
Civ. P. 4).
70. Suttle v. Reich Bros. Constr. Co., 333 U.S. 163, 166-68 (1948); American Cyanamid Co. v.
Hammond Lead Prods., Inc., 495 F.2d 1183 (3d Cir. 1974); Manchester Modes, Inc. v. Schuman,
426 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1970); Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez, 346 F.2d 890 (5th Cir. 1965), affd, 384 U.S. 202
(1966); D.C. Electronics, Inc. v. Schlesinger, 368 F. Supp. 1029, 1031 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
71. 542 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2199 (1977).
72. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Usery, 426 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1976), appeal
docketed, No. 77-1270 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 15, 1977), cert. deni'd, 97 S. Ct. 2198 (1977). The Fourth
Circuit sits in Richmond, Virginia, and has appellate jurisdiction over federal courts situated in
Virginia, Maryland, West Virginia, and North and South Carolina. The Eastern District of
Virginia is situated in Alexandria, Virginia, across the Potomac River from Washington, D.C.,
where the District of Columbia Circuit sits.
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Although most federal agencies process and store contract compliance
records in the District of Columbia, significant exceptions exist. The
Defense Supply Agency (the contract compliance arm of the Department
of Defense) and the Department of the Interior contract compliance
components are situated in Virginia in suburban communities inhabited
largely by federal government employees working in the District of
Columbia. Large portions of the country's industry have their compliance
activities governed by these two compliance agencies. Thus, corporations
in the steel, rubber, petroleum, and electronics industries are able to avail
themselves of venue in the Eastern District of Virginia. This is so despite
the fact that the Department of the Interior, for example, moves its
compliance documents to the District of Columbia when a FOIA request
seeking them is filed.7
3
3. Sovereign Immunity
This government defense is no longer raised as a bar to reverse
FOIA suits although it was vigilantly pursued by the Department of
Justice in Westinghouse.74 There, Judge Bryan rejected a claim of
sovereign immunity made by the Department of Defense, concluding
that the relief sought was not of the type that would" 'expend itself on
the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the public administra-
tion' to the extent that the Government would be 'stopped in its
tracks.' ",75 In addition, he found the actions of the federal officers to
be sufficiently "beyond their statutory powers so that those actions
would not be the actions of the sovereign. '76
In the District of Columbia, where jurisdiction in reverse FOIA
cases had usually been founded on the APA prior to the Supreme
Court's .decision in Califano v. Sanders,77 the sovereign immunity
argument was easily disposed of 78 in light of that circuit's leading
decision in Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer,79 which held that
the APA is a waiver of sovereign immunity.8 0 Now that the District of
73. In a hearing seeking a temporary restraining order, Judge Bryan sitting in the Eastern
District of Virginia in the Alexandria Division rejected the Department of the Interior's argument
that venue in Virginia was improper because the documents at issue had been transported to
Washington, D.C., during the pendency of the FOIA request seeking them. Vistron Corp. v.
Andrus, No. 77-85-A (E.D. Va. Feb. 23, 1977).
74. 392 F. Supp. 1246, 1248 (E.D. Va. 1974), aff'd, 542 F.2d 1190(4th Cir. 1976), crt. denied, 97
S. Ct. 2199 (1977).
75. Id. (citing Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 738 (1947)).
76. Id.
77. 430 U.S. 99 (1977); see notes 61-64 supra and accompanying texL
78. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, 384 F. Supp. 996, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
79. 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
80. Id. at 873.
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Columbia Circuit has abandoned its view that jurisdiction is predi-
cated on the APA, presumably it will follow the Fourth Circuit's lead
on the sovereign immunity issue, should it arise.
F. Substantive Questions Raised
by Reverse FOIA Cases
1. Exemption 4 as
a Bar to Disclosure
The federal courts have now recognized the right of government
contractors to initiate suit in federal district court to enjoin the release
by the government of information deemed to be "commercial or
financial" within the meaning of exemption 4.81 Numerous courts have
construed exemption 4 and with near unanimity have held that "the
plain meaning of. . . 'this section exempts only (1) trade secrets and (2)
information which is (a) commercial or financial, (b) obtained from a
person, and (c) privileged or confidential. The exemption given by
the Congress does not apply to information which does not satisfy
the three requirements stated in the statute.' ",82
Similarly, exemption 4 has been construed to serve the function of
protecting the privacy and competitive position of the citizen who
offers information to assist government policymakers. 83 Documents
generated by the government, however, have not traditionally been
protected from disclosure under exemption 4.84 In the seminal case of
National Parks and Conservation Association v. Morton,85 the District
81. Exemption 4 exempts from disclosure "trade secrets and commercial or financial Information
obtained from a person and privileged or confidential." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1970).
82. Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (footnote omitted); accord, Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, 384 F. Supp. 996, 1005 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd, 553 F.2d 1378 (D.C. Cir.
1977); Rabbitt v. Department of the Air Force, 383 F. Supp. 1065, 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Tax
Analysts & Advocates v. IRS, 362 F. Supp. 1298, 1307 (D.D.C. 1973), modified on other
grounds, 505 F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Consumers Union, Inc. v. VA, 301 F. Supp. 796, 802
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971). But see Barceloneta Shoe Corp.
v. Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591 (D.P.R. 1967) (any privileged or confidential data is protected
from disclosure by exemption 4).
83. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 824 (1970).
84. See Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1069 n.47 (D.D.C. Cir. 1971); Grumman Aircraft
Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578, 582 (D.C Cir. 1970); Fisher v. Renegotiation
Bd., 355 F. Supp. 1171, 1174 (D.C. 1973); Consumers Union, Inc. v. VA, 301 F. Supp. 796,
802-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971); Benson v. GSA, 289 F.
Supp. 590, 594 (W.D. Wash. 1968), affd, 415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1969); Davis, The Information
Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. Chi. L. Rev. 761, 737-92 (1967). But see Brockway v.
Department of the Air Force, 518 F.2d 1184, 1188 (8th Cir. 1975).
85. 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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of Columbia Circuit construed the meaning of the term "confidential or
privileged" commercial or financial information as used in exemption 4
to encompass information which, if disclosed by the government,
would be likely to: "(1) impair the Government's ability to obtain
necessary information in the future; or (2) to cause substantial harm to
the competitive position of the person from whom the information was
obtained. '86
It should be made clear at the outset, however, that compliance agency
promises of confidentiality may not overrule the disclosure provisions of
the FOIA. Thus such assurances are meaningless unless the documents
are independently exempt from disclosure under one of the nine excep-
tions8 7 to disclosure set out in the FOIA.8 8 The ultimate question then is
what material and information can be shown to be " confidential."
The pertinent legislative history of exemption 4 reads as follows:
This exception is necessary to protect the confidentiality of information which is obtained
by the Government through questionnaires or other inquiries, but which would cus-
tomarily not be released to the public by the person from whom it was obtained. This
would include business sales statistics, inventories, customer lists, and manufacturing
processes. 9
It would also include information which is given to an agency in confidence, since a citizen
must be able to confide in his Government. Moreover, where the Government has
obligated itself in good faith not to disclose documents or information which it receives, it
should be able to honor such obligations.9"
(a) Information Which Has Been
Barred from Disclosure
Relying upon exemption 4, and particularly the interpretation given it in
National Parks,91 numerous federal courts have barred the government
from disclosing those portions of AAPs and EEO-Is 92 which would allow
86. Id. at 770 (footnote omitted).
87. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
88. Otherwise agencies could subvert the FOIA by promising confidentiality whenever a
record is submitted. The courts have uniformly rejected such a "wild card" exemption. See
Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Getman v. NLRB,
450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Save the Dolphins v. Department of Commerce, 404 F. Supp. 407
(N.D. Cal. 1975).
89. S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 9 (1965). See also GSA v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878,
881-82 (9th Cir. 1969).
90. H.R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1966).
91. See notes 85-86 supra and accompanying text.
92. A common fallacy is that a per se exemption from disclosure exists for AAPs, EEO-is, or
CRRs, or all three together. The courts, however, have not been influenced by the way in which
affirmative action information has been labeled. Rather, they have looked to the underlying
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a competitor to: (1) derive a contractor's labor costs; 93 (2) inform itself of
new products and processes being developed by the contractor;94 (3) work
up an analysis of the contractor's production capabilities;95 (4) develop
competitive bid strategies; 96 (5) identify the contractor's customers and
their consumptive needs;97 (6) raid the contractor's staff to meet minority
group hiring quotas (manning tables);98 (7) determine the use of the
contractor's work force and the technology it uses; 99 and (8) reduce the
risk-taking in purchasing capital equipment by examining the contrac-
tor's fluctuations in labor costs.' 00
In addition, disclosure of promotion plans has been barred because
of the competitive injury which would be sustained by contractors
through its effect on employee morale and productivity,' 0 ' and because
disclosure of the information would amount to an unwarranted inva-
sion of personal privacy of those employees who could be identified. 0 2
substance to determine whether the data are commercial or financial in nature. Indeed, in
exempting information from release, the courts are usually quite careful to note that their decision
applies only to the documents before the court and not to a broader class of documents. See cases
cited in notes 93-103 infra.
93. See Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Kleppe, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1337 (W.D. Tenn. 1976);
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 392 F. Supp. 1246, 1249 (E.D. Va. 1974), aff'd, 542 F.2d
1190 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2199 (1977); United States Steel Corp. v. Schlesinger,
8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 923 (E.D. Va. 1974), affld sub nom. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2199 (1977). But see Vistron
Corp. v. Andrus, No. 77-85-A (E.D. Va. Feb. 23, 1977); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Schlesinger, 384
F. Supp. 292, 297 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
94. Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 412 F. Supp. 171, 176 (D. Del. 1976); see Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 392 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Va. 1974), aff'd, 542 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2199 (1977); United States Steel Corp. v. Schlesinger, 8 Fair Empi.
Prac. Cas. 923, 924 (E.D. Va. 1974), aff'd sub nom. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542
F.2d 1190, 1196 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2199 (1977).
95. United States Steel Corp. v. Schlesinger, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 923 (E.D. Va. 1974), qfl'd
sub nom. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S.
Ct. 2199 (1977).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Usery, 426 F. Supp. 150, 160 (D.D.C. 1976), appeal
docketed, No. 77-1270 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 15, 1977), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2198 (1977); Chrysler Corp.
v. Schlesinger, 412 F. Supp. 171,176 (D. Del. 1976). But see Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Schlesinger, 384
F. Supp. 292, 297-98 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
99. See Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 412 F. Supp. 171, 176 (D. Del. 1976); United States Steel
Corp. v. Schlesinger, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 923, 924 (E.D. Va. 1974), offdsub non. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1196 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97"S. Ct. 2199 (1977).
100. See Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 412 F. Supp. 171 (D. Del. 1976).
101. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Usery, 426 F. :Supp. 150, 165 (D.D.C. 1976), appeal
docketed, No. 77-1270 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 15, 1977), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2198 (1977).
102. See id. at 166-68; Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Schlesinger 384 F. Supp. 292, 298 (C.D. Cal.
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Some courts have, however, ordered some AAP and EEO-I material
disclosed after concluding that the release of the information at issue in
those cases would not injure the competitive position of the com-
pany. 103
(b) The Agency Discretion Argument
One of the currently unresolved issues in reverse FOIA cases is
whether the compliance agencies may, in their discretion, release
admittedly trade secret data. As noted earlier, the OFCCP has re-
served that right by regulation, and has argued that the courts must
weigh the right to public disclosure against the right of the contractor
to protect its confidential data. Under this theory, a reverse FOIA
plaintiff seeking to bar the release of documents would have a twofold
burden.
First, it would have to show that the documents were exempt from
disclosure under the FOIA and that a person seeking them could not
compel the agency to release them. Nonetheless, this may be in-
sufficient to overcome the argument that the agency may release the
documents if it so chooses because the FOIA neither authorizes nor
prohibits disclosure of exempt information. Disclosure of exempt in-
formation, it has been argued, is therefore discretionary with the
agency.' 04 Second, the reverse FOIA plaintiff seeking to bar the
release of confidential data must then urge upon the court a statute,
rule, regulation, or any declaration of legislative policy that restricts
the government's discretion to disclose.
The Fourth Circuit has rejected this balancing test approach and
construed the legislative history of exemption 4 to give a private
supplier of information the right to enjoin disclosure of its confidential
data "as a matter of right, and as a matter basic to our free enterprise
system." 105 The Fifth Circuit has taken a similar position' 0 6 as has
the Ninth Circuit, 10 7 although the Ninth Circuit later revoked its
position on rehearing.10 8
103. Vistron Corp. v. Andrus, No. 77-85-A (E.D. Va. Feb. 23, 1977); Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Dunlop, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1734, 1735 (D.D.C. 1976) (preliminary injunction denied);
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, 402 F. Supp. 378, 383 (D.D.C. 1975), rer.'d, 553 F.2d 1378 (D.C. Cir.
1977); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 292, 297-98 (C.D. Cal. 1974); Legal Aid
Soc'y v. Schultz, 349 F. Supp. 771, 776-77 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
104. Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 941-42 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Moore-
McCormack Lines, Inc. v. I.T.O. Corp., 508 F.2d 945, 950 (4th Cir. 1974).
105. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1211 & n.70 (4th Cir. 1976), crt.
denied, 97 S. CL 2199 (1977).
106. Continental Oil Co. v. FPC, 519 F.2d 31, 35-36 (5th Cir. 1975), cm. denied, 425 U.S. 971
(1971).
107. See Union Oil Co. v. FPC, 542 F.2d 1036, 1044-45 (9th Cir. 1976).
108. Id. at 1045-46.
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2. Exemption 3 as a Bar to Disclosure
Exemption 3 to the FOIA 0 9 exempts from disclosure information
"specifically exempted from disclosure by statute."' 10 In a broad reading
of this exemption, the Supreme Court in Administrator, FAA v.
Robertson"' construed exemption 3 to encompass a broadly worded
statute which gave the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration much discretionary authority to withhold information from the
public. 112 The breadth of this interpretation startled those who favored a
narrow reading of exemption 3 that would allow greater access to gov-
ernment documents.
Since the decision in Robertson, the statute at issue there 113 has stood
as a benchmark for comparison with regard to other statutes which may
fall within the scope of exemption 3. 14 The legislative history of the
FOIA vaguely refers to some 100 statutes which bar government disclo-
sure of information.115 Determining which statutes fall within exemption
3 has become a process of judicial inclusion and exclusion on a case-by-
case basis.
(a) 18 U.S.C. § 1905 as a
Bar to Disclosure
With regard to AAPs and EEO-ls, employers have argued that
section 1905 of title 18 of the United States Code falls within the scope of
exemption 3 and bars their disclosure. That statute makes it a criminal
offense for government employees to disclose trade secrets including
confidential statistical data and certain other kinds of confidential com-
mercial information described by the statute. 1 16
109. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(3) (Supp. 1977).
110. Id.
111. 422 U.S. 255 (1975).
112. 49 U.S.C. § 1504 (1970). This statute permits the Administrator of the FAA to withhold any
information obtained by the agency if he determines that disclosure "would adversely affect the
interests of [any person objecting to disclosure] and is not required in the interest of the public." Id.
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Kleppe, 547 F.2d 673, 686 n.48 (D.D.C.
1976) (construing amended version of exemption 3).
115. See H.R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1966). See also Administrator, FAA v.
Robertson, 422 U.S. 255, 265 (1975).
116. "Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States or of any department or agency
thereof, publishes, divulges, discloses, or makes known in any manner or to any extent not au-
thorized by law any information coming to him in the course of his employment or official duties or by
reason of any examination or investigation made by, or return, report or record made to or filed with,
such department or agency or officer or employee thereof, which information concerns or relates to
the trade secrets, processes, operations, style of work, or apparatus, or to the identity, confidential
statistical data, amount or source of any income, profits, losses, or expenditures of any person, firm,
[Vol. 46
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Prior to Robertson, the District of Columbia Circuit1 17 twice held that
section 1905 was not within exemption 3 and thus could not be asserted by
contractors to bar disclosure. I18 The same court subsequently reaffirmed
its view a year and a half later in a case' 1 9 decided after Robertson.
The Fourth Circuit has, however, expressly held that section 1905 falls
within exemption 3, a decision which the Supreme Court has recently
refused to review.120 In so doing, however, the Fourth Circuit construed
the protection offered by section 1905 and exemption 4 to be "co-
extensive" and thus gave no greater protection to confidential commercial
records under section 1905 than that already provided under exemption
4.121 As noted above, however, the protection the court found for the
records of government contractors under exemption 4 was very broad. . 22
partnership, corporation, or association; or permits any income return or copy thereof or any book
containing any abstract or particular thereof to be seen or examined by any person except as provided
by law; shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and shall
be removed from office or employment." 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1970).
117. The great majority of FOIA cases are filed in the District of Columbia because that is the
headquarters of the federal government and because the federal judiciary there has greater expertise
in matters of administrative law. Additionally, the overwhelming majority of FOLA, cases filed in the
courts seek the release of documents, a principle to which courts in the District of Columbia are
widely thought to be more favorably disposed than those in any other federal jurisdiction. Neverthe-
less, the 1974 amendments to the FOIA included expanded venue provisions: "On complaint, the
district court of the United States in the district in which the complainant resides, or has his principal
place of business, or in which the agency records are situated, or in the District of Columbia, has
jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any
agency records improperly withheld from the complainant." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)l4)tB) (Supp. V 1975).
118. Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 941 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Grumman
Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578, 580 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See also
Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Weinberger, 401 F. Supp. 444, 446, n.1 (D.D.C. 1975); Ditlow v.
Volpe, 362 F. Supp. 1321, 1323 (D.D.C. 1973), ret'd sub nom. Ditlow v. Brinegar, 494 F.2d 1073
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 974 (1974).
The Grumman court explained its reasoning as follows: "Unlike other statutes which specifically
define the range of disclosable information .... section 1905 merely creates a criminal sanction for the
release of 'confidential information.' Since this type of information is already protected from disclo-
sure under the Act by § 552(b)(4), section 1905 should not be read to expand this exemption, especially
because the Act requires that exemptions be narrowly construed." 425 F.2d at 580 n.S.
119. National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Kleppe, 547 F.2d 673, 686-87 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
120. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1209(4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
97 S. Ct. 2199 (1977).
121. Id. at 1204 n.38; see Vistron Corp. v. Andrus, Cir. No. 77-35-A (E.D. Va. Feb. 23, 1977).
But see Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, 553 F.2d 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Pharmaceutical Mfrs. A.s'n
v. Weinberger, 401 F. Supp. 444, 446 (D.D.C. 1975). In this context, see Crown Central Petroleum
Corp. v. Kleppe, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 49, 52-54 (D. Aid. Nov. 24, 1976), in which for the first
time the documents at issue were found not to qualify simultaneously as trade secret information
within the meanings of both exemption 4 and section 1905. This result is not explained in the decision
except to note that the plaintiff did not urge exemption 4 upon the court although fully aware of
Westinghouse. See note 105 supra and accompanying text
122. See notes 91-102 supra and accompanying text.
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The confusion over the applicability of section 1905 has taken on a new
dimension in recent months with the amendment of exemption 3 of the
FOIA by the Government in the Sunshine Act. 123 The struggle over the
applicability of section 1905 via exemption 3 as a device to bar disclosure
is, thus, far from over, even though the struggle may well be for nought if
the Fourth Circuit is correct in its assertion that section 1905 and exemp-
tion 4 are co-extensive.
Exemption 3, as amended, now reads:
This section does not apply to matters that are . . . (3) specifically exempted from
disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute
(A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave
no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers
to particular types of matter to be withheld . . 124
The stated purpose of the amendment contained in its legislative
history 125 was to narrow exemption 3 (thus making more documents
available to the public) and to specifically overrule the Supreme
Court's decision in Administrator, FAA v. Robertson. 126
In so doing, however, the House report refers to section 1905 as a
statute which could be invoked to affect the agency's discretion once it
was established that the documents at issue fall within exemption 4:
Thus, for example, if material did not come within the broad trade secrets exemption
contained in the Freedom of Information Act, section 1905 would not justify withhold-
ing; on the other hand, if material is within the trade secrets exemption of the Freedom
of Information Act and therefore subject to disclosure if the agency determines that
disclosure is in the public interest, section 1905 must be considered to ascertain
whether the agency is forbidden from disclosing the information.2 7
Government FOIA litigation specialists, and particularly the Privacy
and Freedom of Information Unit at the United States Department of
Labor, have taken the position that the House report language set out
above precludes the use of section 1905 in both exemption 3 and 4
cases. Such a position would appear to be at odds with the legislative
123. Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 5(b), 90 Stat. 1247 (codified at 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (Supp. 1977))
(effective March 12, 1977).
124. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(3) (Supp. 1977).
125. H.R. Rep. No. 880 (Pt. I), 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 22-23 (1976). See also National Parks &
Conservation Ass'n v. Kleppe, 547 F.2d 673, 687 & n.49 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
126. 422 U.S. 255 (1975).
127. H.R. Rep. No. 880 (Pt. I), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1976). See also Charles River Park "A",
Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 941 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1975), and cases cited therein.
It has been argued that a reverse FOIA plaintiff seeking to bar the release of documents has a
twofold burden. See pt. II.F. .(b) supra. This approach, although rejected by the Fourth Circuit in
Westinghouse, see note 105 supra and accompanying text, ippears to underlie the thinking in the
House report.
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history, however, because the recent amendment of exemption 3128 did
not repeal section 1905. It is still good law. A contractor should still be
able to rely on exemption 3 by invoking section 1905 to show that the
proposed release of information is not in the public interest embodied
in that section, which operates to restrict agency discretion in favor of
disclosure. 12
9
With regard to the question of whether the amended exemption 3
incorporates section 1905, the House report accompanying the Gov-
ernment in the Sunshine Act is unclear. 130 It would appear, nonethe-
less, that the intent was to make section 1905 an independent source of
authority, separate from exemption 4, to bar disclosure. Given the
considerable confusion surrounding section 1905, however, the District
of Columbia Circuit, in its most recent reverse FOIA case, 31 refused
to rule on whether exemption 3 incorporated section 1905 and re-
manded the case to the district court for further consideration in light
of the amendment to exemption 3 of the FOIA. 132
Neither these issues nor the fear that he was failing to abide by the
Fourth Circuit's recent precedent in Westinghouse, 133 however, de-
terred a federal judge in Maryland from raising sua sponte-on behalf
of the government-the issue of the continuing validity of section 1905
in light of the most recent amendments to exemption 3.134
(b) The Civil Rights Act as
a Bar to Disclosure
Along with section 1905, reverse FOIA plaintiffs have attempted to
find other statutes within the ambit of exemption 3 which would serve
as a bar to the release of affirmative action data. One statute which
looked promising for this purpose was section 709(e) of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.135 The courts have narrowly interpreted this statute,
128. See notes 123-24 supra and accompanying text.
129. It should be made clear that any discretion the agency might have to release confidential
data stems from the FOIA and is not to be confused with agency discretion as that term is used in the
Administrative Procedure Act. Agency discretion and considerations of the public interest may be
required under the FOIA insofar as exemptions from disclosure are permissive with the agency and
not mandatory. As noted above, see pt. II.F. l.(b) supra, this issue of agency discretion is still
unresolved.
130. H.R. Rep. No. 880 (Pt. 1), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
131. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, 553 F.2d 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
132. Id. at 1385 (decided in light of FAA, Administrator v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 955 (1975)).
133. 542 F.2d 1190, 1210 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. CL 2199 (1977).
134. See Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Kleppe, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 49, 54 (D. Nid.
Nov. 24, 1976) (held section 1905 did not fall within the ambit of exemption 3).
135. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(e) (1970). The statute states: "It shall be unlawful for any officer or
employee of the Commission to make public in any manner whatever any information obtained by
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however, to apply only to the EEOC and not to the OFCCP or any of
its sixteen compliance agencies. 1 36 As a result, this avenue of approach
appears to be blocked as to all agencies except the EEOC.
III. ACCESS TO NLRB DOCUMENTS
A. Introduction
Beginning with the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 137 the NLRB has been in the forefront shaping FOIA
case law. Since that decision, the NLRB has been at the center of the
current controversy over the use of the FOIA as a discovery device to
be used by persons in litigation with federal agencies. Fearful that the
FOIA represents an expansion of traditionally limited agency discovery
procedures, several investigatory federal agencies, in addition to the
NLRB, have been involved in the question of whether the FOIA or
the agency discovery regulations apply. 138
the Commission pursuant to its authority under this section prior to the institution of any proceeding
under this subchapter involving such information. Any officer or employee of the Commission who
shall make public in any manner whatever any information in violation of this subsection shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $1,000, or
imprisoned not more than one year." Id.
136. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 392 F. Supp. 1246, 1249 (E.D. Va. 1974),
affld, 542 F.2d 1190, 1199 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2199 (1977); Legal Aid Soc'y v.
Schultz, 349 F. Supp. 771, 775-76 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
137. 421 U.S. 132 (1975). It was held that the NLRB could not raise exemption 5 as a bar to
disclosing Advice and Appeals Memoranda written by the General Counsel to Regional Directors
explaining decisions by the General Counsel not to file complaints in unfair labor practice cases.
However, Advice and Appeals Memoranda directing that complaints be filed were held to be exempt
from disclosure under exemption 5 as predecisional attorney work product. Id. at 154-55.
Exemption 5 states: "This section does not apply to matters that are ...(5) inter-agency or
intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an
agency in litigation with the agency." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1970).
138. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. I.T.O. Corp., 508 F.2d 945, 950 (4th Cir. 1974);
Verrazano Trading Corp. v. United States, 349 F. Supp. 1401, 1402-03 (Cust. Ct. 1972).
Commenting on the use of the FOIA as a discovery device, Donald I. Baker, former Assistant
Attorney General in the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice stated: "There is one
aspect of openness in government which concerns me, for I feel that its mechanics have been
abused. The Freedom of Information Act was designed primarily so that public interest groups,
scholars and the press could gain access to government records and information which would be
of value to the public in understanding the operations of the government. In the past eighteen
months the Antitrust Division has received less than a dozen Freedom of Information Act
requests from the press, public interest groups and people doing research.
"We have, however, received a deluge of requests from antitrust counsel who happily believe
that they have uncovered a new discovery device. Time and again, defense counsel in govern-
ment antitrust suits have attempted to use the Freedom of Information Act to gain access to
documents and information in our files that they could riot reach using the discovery methods
provided for by the Federal Rules of Civil or Criminal Procedure.
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B. NLRB Discovery Rules
NLRB administrative law judges are authorized to order, in their
discretion, the NLRB to produce "any statement" of the witness in the
possession of the General Counsel which "relates to the subject matter
as to which the witness has testified." 139 The procedure usually
employed is for the NLRB to supply a copy of the witness' statement
immediately after he has testified so that cross-examination may pro-
ceed. If there is additional information given in the statement about
which the witness did not testify, the General Counsel is authorized 4 °
to submit the statement to the administrative law judge in camera and
seek excision of information not relating to the oral testimony given.
The administrative law judge, in his discretion, may refuse to excise
portions of the information given in the statement which relate to
matters raised in the pleadings but not given orally by the witness
while on the stand. The expurgated version of the statement is then
delivered to counsel and cross-examination is allowed to proceed.
Because the NLRB's rule is patterned after the Jencks' Act, 41 court
decisions construing that Act may be helpful in interpreting the rule.142
In practice, NLRB staff attorneys are advised to reject demands for
statements, affidavits, or documents in their possession except in the
following situations: "Where a witness has been given or is about to be
given the document to refresh his memory, or to impeach his tes-
timony", or "Where the General Counsel has granted advance permis-
sion.,143
It should also be noted, however, that despite the NLRB's histori-
cally non-existent discovery procedures, there exists in the law of
evidence a discretionary right of access to memoranda or notes used by
"An extremely egregious case occurred recently. The defendants in a government suit were
seeking to discover some data that had been collected and analyzed by one of our attorneys. We
felt the information was irrelevant to the litigation and refused to turn it over. The defendants
took us to court and made a motion for production of documents under Rule 34, but the judge
agreed with us and denied their motion. Undaunted, defense counsel restyled their motion as a
Freedom of Information Act request and mailed the papers to our Freedom of Information
Officer. I appreciate imaginative lawyering as much as you, but in my opinion such use of the
Freedom of Information Act clearly frustrates the purpose of having rules to govern civil and
criminal litigation and discovery." Address of Donald I. Baker, N.Y.S. Bar Association Antitrust
Law Section (Jan. 26, 1977).
139. 29 C.F.R. § 102.118(b)(1) (1976).
140. Id. § 102.118(b)(2).
141. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970).
142. NLRB Case Handling Manual § 10394.7, reprinted in NLRB Case Handling Manual
(CCH) 3947.
143. NLRB Case Handling Manual § 10400.1(a)-(b), reprinted in NLRB Case Handling
Manual (CCH) 4001(a)-(b).
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the witness to refresh his recollection even if those notes or memoranda
were not used while on the stand. 144 In addition, an adverse inference
may arise against the NLRB if it refuses to produce relevant docu-
ments exclusively in its possession and which it has the ability to
produce. 14
5
Numerous due process challenges to these NLRB discovery
"rights" have been brought and failed. The courts have, however,
recognized that a right of discovery before an adjudicatory agency
exists if the employer can show that he was prejudiced by the lack of
it. 146 The courts have construed the term prejudice, however, to
require an employer either to be denied a hearing or the right to
cross-examine witnesses.
These narrow after-the-fact discovery provisions virtually begged for
litigation under the FOIA, especially in light of language in NLRB v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co. 147  which suggested that access to agency
documents under the FOIA was co-extensive with traditional discov-
ery rules in some circumstances.148 In a footnote citing with approval
the House report accompanying the FOIA, the Court noted that
144. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 132 (1942); Miles v. Clairmont Transfer Co.,
35 Mich. App. 319, 320-23, 192 N.W.2d 619, 620-21 (1971); Doxtator v. Swarthout, 38 App.
Div. 2d 782, 782, 328 N.Y.S.2d 150, 151-52 (1972); Fed. R. Evid. 612.
145. See UAW v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1329, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Evans Packing
Co., 463 F.2d 193, 197 (6th Cir. 1972); P.R. Mallory & Co. v. NLRB, 400 F.2d 956, 959 (7th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 918 (1969); 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 291 (3d ed. 1940).
146. NLRB v. Rex Disposables, Div. of DHJ Indus., Inc., 494 F.2d 588, 591-92 (5th Cir.
1974); Electromec Design & Dev. Co. v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1969); NLRB v.
Southern Materials Co., 345 F.2d 240, 244 (4th Cir. 1065). See also Smith v. Schlesinger, 513
F.2d 462, 475-78 (D.C. Cir. 1975); NLRB v. Safway Steel Scaffolds Co., 383 F.2d 273, 277-78
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 955 (1967); Firestone Synthetic Fibers Co. v. NLRB, 374 F.2d
211, 214 (4th Cir. 1967).
147. 421 U.S. 132 (1975).
148. Id. at 148-55. Recently, the Chairman's Task Force on the NLRB has recommended
some expanded discovery procedures:
"31. Complaints should be more specific as to 'who, what, when, and where,' and bills of
particulars should be granted to remedy any deficiencies. (The identification of individuals
here refers to the respondent or its agents).
32. Advance disclosure of the names of outside ecperts should be required.
33. The exchange of documentary evidence should take place, preferably in advance of but at
least at the pretrial conference, so long as there is no required identification of Individual
employees.
34. Issues and positions of the parties should be 'identified' at a pretrial conference held on
the day of the hearing.
35. In back-pay cases, full disclosure should be available concerning information which
would tend to verify, contradict, or further clarify the material in the files of the General
Counsel." Chairman's Task Force on the NLRB, Interim Report and Recommendations
(1976), reprinted in 1 Lab. Rel. Rep. (CCH) 93 LRR 221, 247 (Nov. 20, 1976).
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"[e]xemption 5 was intended to permit disclosure of those intra-agency
memoranda which would 'routinely be disclosed' in private litigation,
. . . and we accept this as the law. '149
The Court, however, did not construe the 1974 amendments to the
investigatory files exemption,'" 0 but remanded the case to the court of
appeals for further consideration of this issue.' 5 '
C. Employer Access to Witness Statements
Soon thereafter employers began to litigate the first of over forty
cases to be brought seeking access to employee witness statements and
investigative reports compiled by NLRB investigators in unfair labor
practice investigations. Although the early case law was unclear, it
now appears that the NLRB may raise exemption 7(A) as a bar to
disclosure and bar employer access to employee witness statements. 5 2
149. 421 U.S. at 149 n.16 (citations omitted).
150. Exemption 7 now states: "This section does not apply to matters that are . . . (7)
investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the
production of such records would (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a
person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in the case of a
record compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation,
or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, confidential
information furnished only by the confidential source, (E) disclose investigative techniques and
procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel." S U.S.C. §
552(b)(7) (Supp. V 1975).
151. 421 U.S. at 165 n.30.
152. NLRB v. Hardeman Garment Corp., 95 L.R&R.M. 2780 (6th Cir. June 22, 1977);
Bellingham Frozen Foods v. Henderson, No. 76-1684 (9th Cir. May 3, 1977), rev'g 91 L.R.RM.
2761 (W.D. Wash. 1976); New England Medical Center Hosp. v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 377 (1st Cir.
1976); Harvey's Wagon Wheel, Inc. v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1976); Cessna Aircraft Co.
v. NLRB, 542 F.2d 834 (10th Cir. 1976); DNfaremount Corp. v. NLRB, 93 L.R.R.Pl. 2799 (10th
Cir. Oct. 5, 1976); Climax Molybdenum Co. v. NLRB, 539 F.2d 63 (10th Cir. 1976); Goodfriend
W. Corp. v. Fuchs, 535 F.2d 145 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 895 (1976); Kent Corp. v.
NLRB, 530 F.2d 612 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976); Title Guar. Co. v. NLRB, 534
F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976).
District court cases denying employer access include: Furr's Cafeterias, Inc. v. NLRB, 416 F.
Supp. 629 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (citing exemption 7(D)); Pacific Photo Type, Inc. v. NLRB, 92
L.RRM. 2560 (D. Hawaii 1976) (citing exemption 7(A)); Gerico, Inc. v. NLRB, 92 L.R.RM.
2713 (D. Colo. 1976) (citing exemptions 5, 7(A), (C), and (D)); ITT Am. Elec. v. NLRB, 92
L.R.R.M. 2815 (N.D. Aliss. 1976) (citing exemptions 5, 7(A) and (D)); Vegas Village Shopping
Corp. v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 2683 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (citing exemptions 7(A), (C), and (D));
NLRB v. Biophysics Sys., Inc., No. M18-304 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 1976); Electri-Flex v. NLRB,
92 L.R.R.M. 2142 (N.D. IIl. 1976) (citing exemptions 5 and 7(A)); Harowe Servo Controls, Inc.
v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 2572 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (citing exemptions 7(A), (C), and (D)); Atlas Indus.
v. NLRB, 91 L.R.R.M. 2676 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (citing exemption 7(A)); Capital Cities v. NLRB,
91 L.R.R.M. 2565 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (citing exemption 7(A)); Read's, Inc. v. NLRB, 91 L.R.R.M.
2722 (D. Md. 1976) (citing exemption 7(A)); Jamco Int'l v. NLRB, 91 L.IRR.M. 2446 (N.D.
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Moreover, the First Circuit has upheld the right of the NLRB to bar
access under exemption 7(A) to even supervisorial and non-employee
witness statements because their release would interfere with NLRB
enforcement proceedings.15 3 In addition to these cases, however, five
district courts have granted access. The NLRB has appealed all but
one. 154
As for NLRB discovery regulations denying access to witnesses'
statements, it does not appear that NLRB discovery regulations deny-
ing access to witness statement will be expanded in the near future.
D. Employer Access to Union Authorization Cards
Employers have also sought access under the FOIA to union au-
thorization cards on file with the NLRB. This issue is only of recent
vintage and as a result only a handful of cases have been litigated. To
date, results have again been mixed, although employers have won the
right in one case to gain access to the cards.15 5 Four other courts,
including the Third Circuit, have denied employer access citing pri-
vacy exemptions 6156 or 7(C)15 7 of the FOIA. 15 8 Several other cases are
awaiting decision at the trial court level.15 9
Okla. 1976) (citing exemptions 5 and 7(A)); Local 30, United Slate, Tile & Composition Roofers v.
NLRB, 408 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (citing exemption 7(A)); Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
NLRB, 407 F. Supp. 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (citing exemptions 7(A), (C), and (D)); Chassen
Bakers, Inc. v. NLRB, 91 L.R.R.M. 2345 (M.D. Pa. 1975) (citing exemption 7(A)); Kaminer v.
NLRB, 90 L.R.R.M. 2269 (S.D. Miss. 1975) (citing exemption 7(D)).
153. New England Medical Center Hosp. v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 377, 382 (1st Cir. 1976).
154. Baptist Memorial Hosp. v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 2645 (W.D. Tenn. 1976), appeal
docketed, No. 76-1953 (6th Cir. June 1, 1976); Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 92
L.R.R.M. 2586 (N.D. Ala. 1976), appeal docketed, No. 76-2099 (5th Cir. Apr. 1, 1976);
McDonnell Douglas Cori. v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 2072 (C.D. Cal. 1976), appeal docketed, No.
76-1580 (9th Cir. Mar. 17, 1976); Poss v. NLRB, 91 L.R.R.M. 2232 (D.D.C. 1975), appeal
docketed, No. 76-1328 (10th Cir. Mar. 5, 1976); cf. Temple-Eastex, Inc. v, NLRB, 410 F.
Supp. 183 (E.D. Tex. 1976) (access granted) (appeal not taken because employer had voluntarily
made witnesses available to NLRB and knew their testimony).
155. Donn Products, Inc. v. NLRB, 93 L.R.R.M. 2065 (N.D. Ohio 1976), appeal docketed,
No. 76-2542 (6th Cir. July 22, 1976).
156. Exemption 6 states: "This section does not apply to matters that are ... (6) personnel
and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1970).
157. See note 150 supra for text of exemption 7(C).
158. Committee on Masonic Homes v. NLRB, 556 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1977) (citing exemption
7(C)); Howard Johnson Co. v. NLRB, No. 77-124 (W.D.N.Y. May 16, 1977) (citing exemptions
6 and 7(C)); L'eggs Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 93 L.R.R.M. 2488 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (citing
exemptions 6 and 7(C)); NLRB v. Biophysics Sys., Inc., 91 L.R.R.M. 3079 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(citing exemption 7(Q).
159. Case, Inc. v. NLRB, No. 77-27 (E.D. Ky., filed Mar. 3, 1977); Madeira Nursing
Home v. NLRB, No. C-1-77-88-14 (S.D. Ohio, filed Dec. 15, 1976); Provincial House, Inc. v.
NLRB, No. 77-02288 (E.D. Mich., filed Apr. 21, 1976).
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To date, the Third Circuit has been the only appellate court to
address the issue. Its recent decision in Committee on Masonic Homes
v. NLRB 160 rejected the NLRB's claimed exemption for authorization
cards under exemptions 5, 7(A), and 7(C), but upheld its exemption 6
argument denying access. In exemption 6 cases, relating to personnel
and medical files, a court must first determine whether disclosure
would result in any invasion of privacy. 161 If an invasion of privacy is
found, the court must then go further and undertake a balancing test,
weighing the seriousness of the invasion against the benefit to the
public of disclosure. 162
In Masonic Homes, the Third Circuit found that release of the cards
would constitute a "serious" violation of privacy because (1) an em-
ployee might be embarrassed or harmed should it come to the employ-
er's or anyone else's attention that such person executed a union
authorization card, (2) it was plausible that employees would be
reluctant to sign a union card if they knew the employer could see who
signed, and (3) the use of secret ballots in union elections demonstrates
a policy that union employees do not have to acknowledge in public
their support for the union. 163 The court found "no significant public
interest in disclosure" and concluded that authorization cards should
be exempt. 164
IV. ACCESS TO OSHA INVESTIGATIVE REPORTS
Employees or employee representatives who believe that their em-
ployer is violating the Occupational Safety and Health Act 165 may
make a written request for an inspection by the OSHA. These requests
must be turned over to the company at the time of any resulting
inspection, although employees may request that their names not be
released to the employer. 166 Despite the flood of FOIA cases at the
160. 556 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1977).
161. See note 156 supra.
162. Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372-73, (1976); Wine Hobby USA,
Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d 133, 136 (3d Cir. 1974); Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 674 (D.C. Or.
1971). Note that exemption 6 is the only exemption in which the requester's reason or need for the
documents is considered by the court. This is because of the language of the exemption, which
requires a balancing in order to determine whether an invasion is "clearly unwarranted." S
U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1970). It should also be noted that exemption 6, on its face, appears to require
a broader construction (through its use of the phrase "clearly unwarranted invasion") than
exemption 7(C), which speaks of merely an "unwarranted invasion" of privacy. Compare id. with
id. § 552(b)(7) (Supp. V 1975).
163. 556 F.2d at 220-21.
164. Id.
165. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1970).
166. Id. § 657(f)(1).
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NLRB seeking employee witness statements, the OSHA has had very
few such requests. 167
However, in Cadena v. United States Department of Labor168 and
Fahr v. United States Department of Labor, 169 two cases litigating a
similar issue, the trial courts ordered the release of the names of
witnesses while denying the Department of Labor's claimed exemption
under exemption 7(C) and 7(D).170 Significantly, however, the requests
were not made by employers but by relatives of an employee killed on
the job. In each of these cases, the relatives sought the names of the
witnesses interviewed by the OSHA for use in wrongful death actions.
In neither case was an employer seeking the names of his employees
during an OSHA violation action. As a result, there could be little fear
of reprisals against the witnesses because their employer was not the
defendant in the wrongful death action. Correspondingly, exemption
7(A), 171 which the NLRB has used with such great success to bar
disclosure of employee witness statements to employers during unfair
labor practice proceedings, 172 was not applicable.
Both cases are interesting, however, in that both courts rejected the
Department of Labor's contentions that witnesses to the accident were
"confidential" within the meaning of exemption 7(D). In Cadena, it
was held, for example, that "[t]he persons interviewed in the course of
this OSHA investigation are potential witnesses whose identities will
ultimately have to be disclosed to a plaintiff whose cause of action
arises out of the accident prompting the OSHA investigation."' 173 In
Fahr, the court took a different tack and construed section 7(D) to
require an "express" pledge of confidentiality to be given to the
witnesses who supplied the information and put the burden on the
Government to prove affirmatively that such an assurance was giv-
en. 1
74
167. Department of Labor FOIA specialists have speculated that this is so because employers
usually order their own safety specialists to investigate accidents and as a result have information
comparable to that developed by OSHA investigators. In addition, it should be noted that
employee witnesses comprise the bulk of the NLRB's case in unfair labor practice proceedings,
whereas OSHA generally relies upon the testimony of (ompliance officers who personally inspect
the employer's workplace and note violations. Employee witnesses may become a factor when
OSHA conducts an inspection following an accident and compliance officers are forced to rely on
eye witnesses to the accident.
168. No. EP-76-CA-55 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 1977).
169. No. 75-1286 (D.N.J. Sept. 14, 1976). Two other cases are currently pending: Gass v.
United States Dep't of Labor, No. 76-C-15 (E.D. Wis., filed Feb. 20, 1976); Clark v. United
States Dep't of Labor, No. 76-285 (W.D.N.Y., filed June 30, 1976).
170. For the text of exemptions 7(C) and 7(D), see note 150 supra.
171. For the text of exemption 7(A), see note 150 supra.
172. See cases in note 152 supra.
173. No. EP-76-CA-55, slip op. at 3-4 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 1977).
174. No. 75-1286, slip op. at 4 (D.N.J. Sept. 14, 1976).
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In both cases, the witness statements were supplied to the FOIA
requester with the names of the witnesses and identifying material
sanitized. Interestingly enough, however, the OSHA voluntarily deliv-
ered portions of its investigative reports, conclusions of investigators,
and findings of relevant code violations to the requester in Fahr. ,7s In
Cadena, however, exemption 5176 was invoked to bar the release of
investigator evaluations, a contention upheld by the court "since these
items of information consist of opinions and evaluations of a govern-
ment investigator.' 177 This result is consistent with case law develop-
ment under exemption 5 which has held that particular factual infor-
mation contained within classes of documents exempt from disclosure
under exemption 5 must be disclosed. 178 It should be noted, however,
that exemption 5 is intended to protect only pre-decisional work
product but not factual material if it can reasonably be segregated.' 79
In summary, the question of employer access to the names of em-
ployee witnesses given to OSHA investigators has yet to be litigated
under the FOIA. It is highly unlikely, however, that such access could be
compelled in the courts. In. such a case, the OSHA, like the NLRB,
would be able to invoke exemption 7(A) to bar disclosure. In addition,
however, the OSHA could presumably invoke exemption 3380 and
argue that it incorporates that portion of the Occupational Health and
Safety Act'8 1 which authorizes the deletion of the names of employee
witnesses.
V. EMPLOYER ACCESS TO
EEOC INVESTIGATORY FILES
Access to the EEOC's investigatory files prior to the time suit has been
filed has been difficult to obtain because of the agency's traditional
reluctance to disclose information and because Congress by statute pro-
vided the agency with strong rights of secrecy. Titie VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,182 as amended, provides in section 706(b) that:
"[c]harges shall not be made public by the Commission,"' 8 3 and in section
709(e) that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any officer or employee of the
175. This was done because there was no ongoing OSHA violation case. The case was
"closed" insofar as the Department of Labor was concerned. Id.
176. For the text of exemption 5, see note 137 supra.
177. No. EP-76-CA-55, slip op. at 2 (XV.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 1977).
178. National Cable Television Ass'n v. FCC, 479 F.2d 183 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
179. See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975).
180. See note 110 supra and accompanying text.
181. 29 U.S.C. § 657(f)(1) (1970).
182. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000 (1970 & Supp. II 1972).
183. Id. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. 11 1972).
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Commission to make public in any manner whatever any information
obtained by the Commission pursuant to its authority under this section
prior to the institution of any proceeding under this subchapter involving
such information. ' 1
84
As a result of these statutory secrecy provisions, the EEOC may avail
itself not only of the usual FOIA anti-disclosure provisions embodied in
exemption 7185 but may also invoke exemption 3186 to bar access to
information specifically exempted from disclosure by statute.
Government contractors do not themselves file AAPs with the EEOC.
The EEOC may receive copies, however, by filing a request with the
compliance agencies pursuant to the EEOC-OFCCP Memorandum of
Understanding (1974),187 an arrangement which has been upheld in the
Eastern District of Virginia. 188 Should an FOIA request be filed with the
EEOC for an AAP, the EEOC has declared its intention to refer the
request to the "originating" compliance agency for determination. 189 As a
result, the EEOC should never have occasion to consider the release of
affirmative action data to a member of the public pursuant to the FOIA.
A troublesome issue, however, which has never been litigated, is the
status of those AAPs voluntarily given to the EEOC by contractors.
Because these records did not "originate" in another agency, it appears
that only a very broad reading of the EEOC's regulations would apply to
these documents. Regardless of how acquired, section 709(e) should stand
as a bar to the release of AAP information to the public. It would appear,
therefore, that a requester could not compel the EEOC to produce
information supporting a charge, 190 including witness statements, under
the FOIA.1 91
184. Id. § 2000e-8(e) (1970).
185. See pt. III supra for a discussion of exemption 7 in the context of NLRB discovery.
186. See note 109 supra and accompanying text.
187. 1 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) 3780.
188. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Rumsfeld, 417 F. Supp. 365 (E.D. Va. 1976), appeal docketed,
Nos. 76-2124-26 (4th Cir. Sept. 27, 1976).
189. "Request for records that originated in another Agency and are in the custody of the
Commission, will be referred to that Agency for proces.ing, and the person submitting the request
shall be so notified. The decision made by that Agency with respect to such records will be
honored by the Commission." 29 C.F.R. § 1610.6 (1976).
190. The term "charges" as used in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) has been broadly construed by
District of Columbia courts to encompass even a pre-determination settlement agreement entered
into by the EEOC and an employer prior to a reasonable cause determination. As a result, access
to these agreements may not be compelled under the FOIA. Parker v. EEOC, 10 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 1239 (D.D.C. 1975), aff'd., 534 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
191. This issue is currently being litigated in the Fourth Circuit. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Hosp. Auth. v. Perry, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 437 (W.D.N.C. 1976), appeal docketed, Nos.
76-2272 and 76-2273 (4th Cir. Nov. 12, 1976) (argued April 4, 1977, and currently awaiting
decision). The district court directed the EEOC to release the affidavits of twelve charging
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A respondent has an express right to notice of a charge, "including the
date, place and circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment prac-
tice" within ten days of the date the charge is filed.' 92 Apart from this
information, however, the EEOC has taken the position that it has
discretion to release additional investigative data within its possession to
the charging party, the respondent, witnesses, and representatives of
interested federal, state, and local agencies. 193 This discretionary right of
release has been specifically upheld so long as release is not made to the
public at large. 194 Access has also been sought under the APA, 195 but it
has been held that the APA does not confer a right of discovery in federal
administrative proceedings. 196
Absent a compulsory right of access for pre-trial discover), of agency
investigative files under the FOIA, Title VII itself, EEOC regulations,
or the APA, employers can only fall back on a constitutional right of
access for pre-trial discovery of agency investigative files. Such a right
has been recognized before other quasi-judicial agencies where there
has been a showing of prejudice to the employer. 197 The EEOC,
however, is not an adjudicatory agency and must seek enforcement of
its proceedings in the courts. In addition, it should be noted that
prejudice has been construed to require either that the employer be
denied a hearing or the right to cross-examine witnesses. Absent such
prejudice, however, discovery before an administrative agency, even a
quasi-judicial agency, has been held to be within the agency's discre-
tion. 1
98
As a result, it appears to be highly unlikely that discovery at the
parties who were not then employed by the defendant employer. Further, the court denied
employer access to eight affidavits on file with the EEOC and submitted by current employees.
In addition, the court specifically forbade the employer from disclosing the affidavits to any
person except in connection with an investigation of the charges. Id. This restriction appears to
be overbroad, however, in that release to one person constitutes a public release under the FOIA.
192. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. I 1972).
193. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.20 (1976).
194. H. Kessler & Co. v. EEOC, 472 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973).
After suit has been initiated by the EEOC, however, additional rights under the discovery
provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure become available to an employer. See EEOC
v. St. Francis Community Hosp., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 423 (D.S.C. 1976) (EEOC's objections
under section 706(b) overruled and release ordered of letters exchanged between the EEOC, the
charging party, and third persons).
195. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1970).
196. Frilette v. Kimberlin, 508 F.2d 205, 208 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc), cer. denied, 421 U.S.
980 (1975).
197. See note 146 supra and accompanying text.
198. NLRB v. Valley Mold Co., 530 F.2d 693, 695 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 77
(1976); NLRB v. Lizdale Knitting Mills, Inc., 523 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1975); Moore v. Adminis-
trator, VA, 475 F.2d 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1973); 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 8.15 (1958).
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EEOC can be compelled beyond that provided for in the EEOC's own
access regulations.
VI. CONCLUSION
The FOIA is a useful, albeit two-edged, discovery tool for employers
in the labor relations area. On the one hand, the FOIA may afford
employers access to some agency documents it seeks, but at the same
time it provides a broad avenue to employer documents on file with the
various federal agencies regulating labor relations activities. If the
current trend toward greater government scrutiny of private business
activity continues to grow in the labor relations area, it can only be
expected that more reverse FOIA cases will be brought by employers
defensively seeking to protect their confidential records from the prying
eyes of the public, and particularly from any market competitors or
labor relations antagonists. At the same time, so long as labor agency
discovery regulations continue to prevent access to information useful
to employers in litigation with the agency, it can be expected that
companies will continue vigorously to use the FOIA affirmatively as a
discovery device to help defend against agency prosecutions.
